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Social health maintenance 
organizations' service use 
and costs, 1985-89 by Charlene Harrington and Robert J. Newcomer 
Presented in this article are aggregate utilization and 
financial data from the four social health maintenance 
organization (SIHMO) demonstrations that were collected 
and analyzed as a part of the national evaluation of the 
SIHMO demonstration project conducted for the Health 
Care Financing Administration. The S/HMOs, in offering 
a $6,500 to $12,000 chronic care benefit in addition to 
the basic HMO benefit package, had higher startup costs 
and financial losses over the first 5 years than expected, 
and controlling costs continues to be a challenge to the 
sites and their sponsors. 
This work was supported by Contract Number 500-85-0042 from the 
Health Care Financing Administration. 
Reprint requests: Charlene Harrington, Ph.D., Department of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, University of California, N-631, San Francisco, 
California 94143-0612. 
Introduction 
After more than a decade of research and 
demonstrations on long-term care programs, the need and 
demand for community long-term care services by those 
who are disabled have been well documented. In previous 
demonstrations, community-based long-term care services 
have been found to improve the quality of clients lives 
and to provide needed support for informal caregivers 
(Kemper, Applebaum, and Harrigan, 1987). The value of 
case-management services, which provides assessment of 
needs, plans of care, arrangements for services, and 
ongoing monitoring of clients, has also been documented 
(Kemper, Applebaum, and Harrigan, 1987). Even though 
positive outcomes have been identified, unfortunately, 
long-term care demonstrations have generally not been 
found to control costs and are likely to increase overall 
costs (Hamm, Kickman, and Cutler, 1982; Kemper, 
Applebaum, and Harrigan, 1987; Weissert, 1985; 
Weissert, 1988; Zawadski, 1983). Thus, the search has 
been for cost-effective long-term care financing and 
service delivery models. 
The social health maintenance organization (S/HMO) 
model was designed as an innovative new approach to 
control costs while expanding long-term care services. 
This demonstration model, designed by Brandeis 
University in 1980, was sponsored by the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) with waivers from the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs (Leutz, Greenberg, and 
Abrahams, 1985). The S/HMO model includes the 
following basic organizational and financing features. 
First, a single organizational structure provides a full 
range of acute and chronic care services to Medicare 
beneficiaries who enroll on a voluntary basis and pay a 
monthly premium for services. The benefits include 
nursing home, home health, homemaker, transportation, 
drugs, and other such services beyond the basic Medicare 
benefits. 
Second, a coordinated case-management system was 
established to authorize long-term care services for those 
members who met specified disability criteria and were 
within a fixed income limit of about $6,250-$12,000 per 
year. The case-management system was also designed to 
improve access to and appropriateness of services 
delivered. Third, S/HMOs were designed to serve a 
cross-section of the elderly population including both the 
functionally impaired and the unimpaired elderly, unlike 
most demonstrations that have been targeted only to the 
impaired elderly. The goal of S/HMOs is to keep 
individuals healthy and perhaps to reduce or slow the rate 
of impairment and disability. Fourth, financing was 
accomplished through prepaid capitation by pooled funds 
from Medicare, Medicaid, and member premiums. The 
initial financial risks were shared by S/HMOs and by 
HCFA, but only S/HMOs assumed full financial risk for 
service costs at the end of the first 30 months of the 
demonstration. The design feature was developed to 
provide an overall financial incentive to S/HMOs to 
control total program costs while allowing greater 
flexibility in the services provided. For a full discussion 
of the initial goals and plans for S/HMOs, see Leutz, 
Greenberg, and Abrahams (1985); Harrington and 
Newcomer (1985); and Greenberg et al., (1988). 
After a delayed start, S/HMO demonstration projects 
became operational in 1985. The S/HMO demonstration 
model was tested by four different organizations in 
different market environments. These new organizational 
models were developed by two types of sponsors: two 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and two types 
of long-term care organizations. Kaiser Permanente (KP) 
Northwest, an established HMO in Portland, Oregon, 
developed Medicare Plus II. A partnership between a 
mature HMO and an experienced direct long-term care 
service provider (that is, Group Health, Inc. (GHI) and 
Ebenezer Society) in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, 
established Seniors Plus. The Metropolitan Jewish 
Geriatric Center, Inc., a direct long-term care service 
provider in Brooklyn, New York, established Elderplan. 
Senior Care Action Network (SCAN), a long-term care 
service broker developed an informal partnership with a 
large medical center and its physician group in 
Long Beach, California, to establish SCAN Health Plan 
(SHP). Thus, two S/HMOs were new products offered by 
existing HMOs, and two were newly formed HMOs by 
organizations with no previous HMO experience. 
One primary goal of the demonstration projects was to 
control S/HMO service utilization and expenditures and to 
develop a financially viable product or organization that 
could sustain itself beyond the demonstration period. In 
this article, we examine the S/HMOs aggregate service 
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utilization and expenditure patterns during the first 5 
calendar years of the demonstration. Differences across 
S/HMO projects in terms of enrollment, the competitive 
market, premiums, disability levels, chronic care 
services, and benefit limits are identified, which account 
for differences in service utilization and expenditure 
patterns (for hospital inpatient care, chronic care, and 
other services). The startup costs were substantially 
higher than expected across all sites, except Medicare 
Plus II. This resulted in one site achieving financial gain 
during the fourth and the fifth years of the demonstration, 
one site showing a net gain in the fourth year, one site 
breaking even in the fifth year, and one site showing 
losses for the 5-year period. The overall effects of these 
financial outcomes on the S/HMO's sponsors and their 
future options for S/HMOs are discussed. 
Methodology 
The first 5 calendar years of project operation from 
January 1985 through December 1989 are covered in this 
article. The primary source of the S/HMO descriptive 
statistics on utilization and financial data were the 
unaudited quarterly and special reports submitted by the 
S/HMOs to the HCFA. These data include measures of 
S/HMO acute and chronic care service use, revenues, and 
expenses. It should be noted that, in some instances, the 
utilization and expenditure data presented in this article 
differ from earlier published reports because S/HMOs 
have adjusted their data based on audit findings and other 
needed adjustments for the period 1985 through 1989. 
The report data were augmented by interviews with 
S/HMO officials and others at each demonstration site 
and by documents collected by HCFA program evaluators 
at the University of California, San Francisco; Berkeley 
Planning Associates; and Duke University (Newcomer, 
Harrington, and Friedlob, 1989 and 1990a). Respondents 
included executive directors and key administrative staff, 
marketing directors, selected board members, and former 
staff. The interviews were conducted at S/HMO sites 
three times between January and December 1986, by 
telephone in spring 1987, and at onsite visits during the 
summers of 1988 and 1989. Focused questions concerned 
key organization, management, and provider 
arrangements considered to be related to the financial 
success of prepaid health plans (Lamb and Associates, 
1980; Fox, Heinen, and Steele, 1986; Luft, 1987). 
Correspondence, contracts, board minutes, reports by the 
sites, audit reports, and other documents were also 
collected and analyzed to verify and supplement the 
interview data. 
Findings 
Each S/HMO had different features or program policies 
that were associated with the differences in S/HMO 
service utilization and expenditures during the first 5 
operational years. This section describes these features. 
Membership size and enrollment 
problems 
Membership size varied across sites and had effects on 
project costs. Although each site had expected to enroll 
about 4,000 individuals, all sites experienced initial 
difficulties in obtaining this target; and two sites were not 
able to reach their targets throughout the first 5 years of 
the demonstration (Table 1). Only Kaiser Permanente's 
Medicare Plus II met its minimum enrollment target of 
4,000 members within the first 18 months after program 
startup. Elderplan had a slow enrollment pattern during 
the first 24 months of operation (2,502 members), but 
enrollment then showed a steady increase to 5,000 
Table 1 
Differences in social health maintenance organization enrollment, premiums, disability levels, and 
chronic care services received, by site: United States, 1985-89 
Site 
Elderplan 
Medicare Plus II 
SCAN Health Plan1 
Seniors Plus 
Elderplan 
Medicare Plus II 
SCAN Health Plan1 
Seniors Plus 
Elderplan 
Medicare Plus II 
SCAN Health Plan1 
Seniors Plus 
Elderplan 
Medicare Plus II 
SCAN Health Plan 
Seniors Plus1 
1985 
770 
3,169 
1,149 
433 
$29.89 
49.00 
40.00 
29.50 
7.5 
4.2 
4.0 
11.5 
4.8 
3.4 
8.7 
13.8 
1986 
2,502 
4,309 
2,075 
1,686 
$29.89 
49.00 
40.00 
24.95 
1987 
Net enrollment 
4,205 
4,987 
2,769 
2,572 
Monthly premiums 
$29.89 
49.00 
40.00 
124.95 
24.95 
1988 
5,000 
5,030 
3,057 
3,021 
$29.89 
57.00 
40.00 
124.95 
29.95 
Percent nursing home certified at year end 
4.1 
6.7 
5.5 
7.2 
4.3 
8.1 
8.7 
9.8 
4.8 
10.5 
10.0 
8.1 
Percent receiving chronic care at year end 
2.9 
4.5 
12.1 
11.0 
3.1 
5.9 
10.0 
13.0 
2.1 
7.3 
9.0 
12.7 
1989 
5,082 
5,412 
2,824 
3,256 
$29.89 
57.85 
42.00 
124.95 
34.95 
5.4 
11.4 
7.9 
8.5 
7.7 
7.5 
8.5 
13.7 
1SCAN Health Plan developed a low-option premium that excluded dental care for 1987. 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
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members in 1988 and to 5,082 in 1989. Seniors Plus was 
the least successful in meeting its initial membership 
target, with only 2,572 enrolled members by 1987 and 
3,256 by the end of 1989. SHP experienced similar slow 
growth, reaching 3,057 members by the end of 1988 and 
then showing a decline by the end of 1989. The decline 
in enrollment in 1989 was reported by SHP to be related 
in part to their increase in pharmacy copayments and 
limits (which were changed in 1990) and to the general 
dissatisfaction of the SHP physician group with their 
contract arrangements. Elderplan and SHP had no 
previous Medicare HMO members, so all of their 
members were new health plan enrollees, whereas the 
two HMOs were able to convert Medicare members from 
their existing HMO program to the S/HMO 
demonstration. (For more information, see also 
Harrington, Newcomer, and Friedlob, 1989; Newcomer, 
Harrington, and Friedlob, 1990b.) Discussed later are the 
marketing costs associated with each site. 
The relationship of enrollment to overall financial costs 
varied across the four sites. Even through Medicare 
Plus II and Elderplan reached their enrollment targets and 
had at least 5,000 members each in 1988, neither plan 
was able to achieve a positive financial balance with its 
enrollment until Elderplan did so in 1989. Seniors Plus, 
with the lowest enrollment, was able to control its 
expenditures and achieved a positive financial picture in 
1988 but not in 1989; whereas SHP, with a low 
enrollment, was able to show a net gain in 1988 and 
1989. Thus, factors other than enrollment were also 
important in affecting the overall financial outcomes of 
each project. 
Competitive market 
The HMO market competition varied across the four 
S/HMO areas and influenced enrollment. In 1985, 
Brooklyn could be considered a newly competitive market 
because it had only one large staff model HMO in 
competition for the Medicare market and an estimated 
7 percent Medicare enrollment in HMOs. At the time 
Medicare Plus II began, Portland was emerging as a 
competitive market with only 16 percent of the elderly 
population enrolled in HMOs. Although there were three 
newly formed HMOs, KP Northwest dominated the HMO 
market in the Portland region. 
Los Angeles and Minneapolis-St. Paul were mature 
competitive markets when the S/HMOs were developed. 
Minneapolis-St. Paul had six competing HMOs and an 
estimated 60 percent HMO enrollment rate for the elderly 
population (Harrington, Newcomer, and Friedlob, 1989). 
Los Angeles had 24 percent of its elderly population 
enrolled in five well-established HMOs in 1985. SHP and 
Seniors Plus were late to enter the elderly HMO market 
and faced severe competition which limited their 
enrollment and affected their marketing costs and overall 
financial picture, especially during the first 3 years as 
they attempted to establish their plans. The competitive 
market situation appears to be a factor associated with 
both the initial and the continued poor enrollment at 
Seniors Plus and SHP. The enrollment problems in turn 
had a direct effect on marketing costs. 
Premium levels 
At all the sites, S/HMO premiums were generally not 
0established at a high enough level to cover the difference 
between Medicare and Medicaid revenues and the 
projected costs of providing plan benefits. The primary 
consideration in setting initial premium levels was to be 
competitive with existing HMOs options in each of the 
areas. During the first year, monthly premium levels 
ranged from $29.50 to $49 (Table 1). S/HMO premiums 
were less than those of competing Medicare supplemental 
policies but greater than competing Medicare HMO 
alternatives. 
The unfavorable pricing of S/HMOs was most 
pronounced in Minneapolis and Long Beach, where the 
competition was greatest. After S/HMOs were initiated, 
Seniors Plus and SHP soon realized the need to reduce 
premiums. Because of this, Seniors Plus lowered its 
premium to $24.95 in March 1986; and SHP reduced its 
base premium to $24.95 in 1987, with optional dental 
benefits for an additional $17.50 per month. Even though 
SHP lowered its premium, its premium remained 
substantially higher than those of most of its competing 
HMOs, which had zero premiums and included drug 
benefits. In 1988, Seniors Plus increased its premium by 
$5, at a time when other competing HMOs increased 
their premiums to an even higher rate. Thus, Seniors Plus 
was competitive in terms of its premium in 1988 until it 
closed its enrollments in November along with its sponsor 
Group Health because they had more members than they 
could accomodate. 
Medicare Plus II had higher premiums than other 
HMOs in the Portland area throughout the 1985-88 
period, but it had little competition when the project 
achieved its initial enrollment. Medicare Plus II was able 
to increase its premiums in 1988 by $8 without negative 
effects on its membership. The premiums were higher 
than other sites, in part because Medicare Plus II had 
greater chronic care benefits and lower copayments for 
chronic care. 
Disability differences across sites 
Each site had a different mix of members in terms of 
their age, sex, and disability levels. The Medicare 
capitation payment rates took these differences into 
account, based on the adjusted average per capita costs 
(AAPCC) for each county, by age, sex, welfare status, 
health status, and institutional status. Each S/HMO 
received 100 percent of a modified AAPCC formula for 
all their Medicare members, subtracting those community 
members who were in bed or at home most or all of the 
time because of a disability or because they needed the 
help of another person in getting around in the 
community (about 5 percent of the community sample). 
Medicare paid 100 percent of the AAPCC institutional 
rate for all members living in the community who were 
determined to be nursing home certifiable according to 
predetermined State Medicaid criteria for disability. 
Although these payment adjustments were made for 
age and disability, the projects were anxious to avoid 
adverse selection at enrollment, which could contribute to 
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financial problems over time. Each S/HMO was required 
to limit its new enrollees to a maximum of 5 percent of 
those who were severely impaired (that is, were nursing 
home certifiable by State Medicaid criteria). S/HMOs 
could screen new applicants and place impaired applicants 
on a waiting list (queing) if they had already enrolled 
more than 5 percent of the impaired. Three sites used 
some screening and queing at different points during the 
first 4 years (all except Medicare Plus II) to control entry 
and, indirectly, to prevent high utilization and costs. 
Seniors Plus reported that their enrolled population was 
older and more disabled than the enrollees in their basic 
Medicare plan (Seniors), and so they used queing from 
November 1985 through 1989. The issue of whether the 
plans had biased selection is being addressed in a separate 
article (Manton, Tolley, and Vertrees, 1990). 
Eligibility for chronic care benefits 
All S/HMO members were eligible to receive benefits 
covered by Medicare (that is, hospital, physician, skilled 
nursing home, skilled home health services, hospice, and 
durable medical equipment), so these benefits did not 
vary across sites. Each S/HMO established its own 
eligibility levels for chronic care services. Case managers 
conducted assessments on individuals to determine 
eligibility and reassessments on a periodic basis, 
authorized the use of chronic care services, and 
monitored service use and eligibility. Throughout the 
5-year period, Medicare Plus II offered benefits only to 
severely impaired individuals (equivalent to those who 
meet the State nursing home certification criteria). 
Elderplan and SHP initially offered chronic care benefits 
to those with severe impairments and also to those with 
moderate impairments. After the first year, Elderplan 
restricted benefits to the severely impaired. SHP restricted 
its benefits to those with severe impairments beginning in 
1988. Seniors Plus offered chronic care services to all its 
members based on need and not on disability levels; these 
included the moderately and severely impaired and others 
considered at risk of increasing disability. As a result, 
eligibility criteria at Seniors Plus were more generous at 
baseline and have continued to be so throughout the 
5-year period. 
These eligibility criteria resulted in different percents of 
members being eligible to receive chronic care services 
(Table 1). Not all members who were eligible for chronic 
care services received services because each site 
established its own procedures for service authorization. 
Table 1 shows that Elderplan not only had the lowest 
percent of members eligible for benefits but also had the 
smallest percent receiving services. Medicare Plus II and 
Seniors Plus had the highest percent of eligibles receiving 
chronic care services. With substantially higher 
proportions of members eligible and receiving chronic 
care services, Seniors Plus would have been expected to 
have higher chronic and expanded care utilization and 
expenditure rates and Elderplan to have the lowest rates. 
This did not prove to be the case, however, as discussed 
in the next section. 
Chronic care benefits 
Chronic care benefits also varied across demonstration 
sites and were limited to $6,250-$12,000 annually with 
copayments. Chronic care services included custodial 
nursing home services, nonskilled home care services, 
homemaker, respite, and other such services. Each site 
had different benefit configurations and total dollar limits 
on chronic care, as shown in Table 2. Clients (or 
Medicaid) paid for any chronic care services required 
beyond the level allowed by S/HMO. 
Elderplan retained its chronic care benefits throughout 
the 5-year period. Medicare Plus II also retained its 
chronic care benefits over time, except that it reduced the 
amount of chronic nursing care days covered per spell of 
illness from 100 days to 30 days in 1989. SHP and 
Seniors Plus both limited their nursing home benefits in 
1988 and 1989 in an effort to control their chronic care 
nursing home utilization and costs, although Seniors Plus 
expanded its chronic care home care benefits. Thus, 
S/HMOs were able to retain the home and community 
benefits and the copayment levels, but they limited 
nursing home services in the last 2 years in response to 
their nursing home utilization and cost experience. 
In addition to chronic care benefits, all sites offered a 
range of expanded care (or supplemental) benefits which 
included prescription drugs, eyeglasses, hearing aids, and 
nonemergency transportation. All sites included drug 
benefits with minimal copayments ($l-$3 per 
prescription), except for SHP in 1989. In order to control 
utilization, SHP added a 25-percent copayment on its 
drug benefit and set an $800 limit for drugs in 1989, 
whereas its principal competitor had a $3 copayment and 
no limit. Because of enrollment problems in 1989, SHP 
changed its copayment to $3 and set a $1,000 limit for 
1990. Two sites (Elderplan and SHP) offered dental 
benefits; Seniors Plus offered preventive dental benefits 
until 1988, and Medicare Plus II did not offer such 
services. Elderplan and Seniors Plus offered routine 
footcare, but the other projects offered only medically 
necessary podiatry. 
Service utilization and expenditures 
Service utilization and expenditures varied across each 
of the projects. To examine these patterns, service use 
and expenditures were grouped into four major categories: 
Medicare-covered acute care and ambulatory care, 
Medicare-covered skilled nursing and home care, non-
Medicare-covered chronic care services, and expanded 
services. Non-Medicare-covered chronic care services 
included skilled nursing, intermediate care, home health, 
homemaker, respite, residential care, transportation, 
meals, and day health. Expanded care services included 
vision, dental, physical examinations, and outpatient 
pharmacy services. These were available to S/HMO 
members without eligibility restrictions. 
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Table 2 
Differences in social health maintenance organization chronic care benefits, by type of health plan and 
type of benefit: United States, 1985-89 
Site and chronic 
care benefit 
Elderplan 
Home and community 
Nursing home 
Overall limit 
Home care copayment 
Nursing home copayment 
Medicare Plus II 
Home and community 
Nursing home 
Overall limit 
Home care copayment 
Nursing home copayment 
SCAN Health Plan 
Home and community 
Nursing home 
Overall limit 
Home care copayment 
Nursing home copayment 
Seniors Plus 
Home and community 
Nursing home 
Overall limit 
Home care copyament 
Nursing home copayment 
1985 
$6,500 per year 
$6,500 per year 
$6,500 per year 
10 percent of charges 
20 percent of charges 
$12,000 per year 
$12,000 per year or 
100 days per stay 
$12,000 per year 
10 percent of charges 
10 percent of charges 
$7,500 per year 
$7,500 per year 
$7,500 per year and 
$9,400 per lifetime 
$5.00 per visit 
15 percent of charges 
$6,250 per year 
$6,250 per year 
$7,800 per lifetime 
$6,250 per year 
20 percent of charges 
20 percent of charges 
1986 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
1987 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
1988 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
$625 per month 
$1,000 per 
month 
$9,400 per 
lifetime 
no change 
$7.50 per visit 
20 percent of 
charges 
$7,200 
21 days per 
spell 
$7,200 per year 
no change 
no change 
1989 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
30 days per 
spell of illness 
no change 
no change 
no change 
$625 per month 
21 days per stay 
and $7,500 
per lifetime 
$7,500 per year 
$7.50 per visit 
20 percent of 
charges 
$7,200 
21 days per 
spell 
$7,200 per year 
no change 
no change 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
Acute and ambulatory care 
The primary problem experienced by S/HMOs was 
managing and controlling hospital utilization and 
expenditures. Hospital utilization patterns during the first 
5 years are shown in Table 3. The two S/HMOs 
sponsored by HMOs were generally able to keep days of 
care, length of stay, and admission rates lower than the 
other two S/HMOs throughout the 5-year period. 
Elderplan had longer lengths of stay, and SHP had higher 
hospital admission rates; thus, both had higher days 
per 1,000 members than the other two projects sponsored 
by HMOs. 
The U.S. average number of Medicare hospital days 
per 1,000 member months for HMOs was 1,945 in 1987 
(InterStudy, 1988). All sites except Elderplan were able 
keep their rates below this level. In 1988, only the two 
S/HMOs sponsored by HMOs (Seniors Plus and Medicare 
Plus II) were able to stay below the U.S. average days of 
care. These patterns are repeated when looking at the 
U.S. average hospital length of stay of 7.3 days per 
hospitalization for Medicare HMO members (InterStudy, 
1988). Again, all S/HMOs except Elderplan were below 
this level. Seniors Plus experienced a sharp increase in 
the average length of hospital stay and days of care in 
1989. 
Although S/HMOs were able to stay below their target 
hospital utilization rates, two considered utilization a 
problem (except Medicare Plus II and Seniors Plus) and 
invested considerable resources in tracking hospital use 
and attempting to reduce utilization. All S/HMOs showed 
a general trend for increased hospital utilization over the 
5-year period as their membership aged. 
Table 4 shows the hospital expenditures per member 
per month (pmpm) for each of the S/HMOs for 1985-89. 
Medicare Plus II had the highest total hospital 
expenditures through the period, even though its 
utilization rates were low, because its hospital costs per 
day were high. Seniors Plus had the lowest hospital 
expenditures, in part because of its lower days of care per 
1,000 and lower hospital rates per day. 
Overall, hospital expenses represented a high 
proportion of the total S/HMO budget, ranging from 
29 to 40 percent of the total budget in 1989 (Table 4). 
SHP and Seniors Plus were within their planned levels of 
hospital expenditures for the 5-year period. Medicare 
Plus II showed a financial loss on its hospital services 
because it waived premiums for deductibles and 
copayments. Elderplan was also not within its hospital 
budget allocations in 1988 because of sharp increases in 
the per day rates charged by its major contract hospital. 
In 1989, Elderplan was able to shift many of its 
hospitalizations to two hospitals that offered per diem 
discount rates and was thus able to keep the rate of 
increase in its hospital costs down for the year. S/HMOs 
reported concern about hospital utilization and 
expenditures and had goals of substantially reducing these 
expenditure rates. 
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Table 3 
Hospital days, length of stay, and admissions per 1,000 members per year at social health maintenance 
organization sites, by site: United States, 1985-89 
Site 
Elderplan 
Medicare Plus II 
SCAN Health Plan 
Seniors Plus 
Elderplan 
Medicare Plus II 
SCAN Health Plan 
Seniors Plus 
Elderplan 
Medicare Plus II 
SCAN Health Plan 
Seniors Plus 
1985 
1,860 
1,538 
1,754 
1,393 
7.9 
6.0 
5.7 
5.1 
235 
256 
301 
235 
1986 1987 
Days of care per 1,000 members per year 
2,533 
1,675 
2,367 
1,194 
Average 
10.2 
5.6 
7.0 
5.4 
2,225 
1,624 
1,785 
1,848 
3 length of stay 
8.5 
5.8 
5.6 
7.2 
Admissions per 1,000 members per year 
249 
298 
299 
227 
261 
279 
324 
256 
1988 
2,109 
1,778 
2,079 
1,889 
11.5 
6.0 
6.4 
6.7 
250 
296 
344 
270 
1989 
2,271 
1,779 
2,135 
2,060 
9.3 
5.8 
6.8 
10.0 
245 
308 
308 
207 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
Table 4 
Expenditures per member per month for services at social health maintenance organization sites, 
by type of expenditure and site: United States, 1985-89 
Type of expenditure 
Total member months 
Total cost 
Provider expenditures 
Hospital2 
Ambulatory 
encounters3 
Medicare nursing 
home4 
Medicare home 
health4 
Other Medicare5 
Chronic care6 
Expanded care7 
Case-management 
staff8 
Administrative expenditures 
Marketing 
Administration9 
Capital and other costs10 
1985 
5,310 
683.96 
(100.0) 
$82.02 
(12.0) 
111.18 
(16.2) 
8.48 
(1.4) 
4.97 
(0.7) 
6.90 
(1.0) 
25.48 
(3.7) 
30.91 
(4.5) 
23.91 
(3.5) 
114.40 
(16.7) 
198.55 
(29.0) 
77.16 
(11.3) 
1986 
19,640 
464.38 
(100.0) 
$107.37 
(23.1) 
88.16 
(19.0) 
7.11 
(1.5) 
4.39 
(0.9) 
5.78 
(1.3) 
32.27 
(7.0) 
40.89 
(8.8) 
9.92 
(2.1) 
52.99 
(11.4) 
81.51 
(17.6) 
33.99 
(7.3) 
Elderplan 
1987 
38,570 
406.66 
(100.0) 
$103.60 
(25.5) 
96.93 
(23.8) 
13.81 
(3.4) 
6.93 
(1.7) 
3.27 
(0.8) 
22.46 
(5.6) 
44.99 
(11.1) 
6.86 
(1.7) 
33.95 
(8.3) 
55.78 
(13.8) 
18.08 
(4.4) 
1988 
56,335 
417.33 
(100.0) 
$139.28 
(33.4) 
115.18 
(27.6) 
14.97 
(3.6) 
12.51 
(3.0) 
5.34 
(1.3) 
30.10 
(7.2) 
33.30 
(8.0) 
6.17 
(1.5) 
13.99 
(3.3) 
38.00 
(9.1) 
8.49 
(2.0) 
1989 
61,488 
403.48 
(100.0) 
$134.01 
(31.9) 
102.83 
(25.5) 
12.22 
(3.0) 
7.03 
(1.7) 
8.13 
(2.0) 
44.12 
(10.9) 
51.61 
(12.8) 
6.36 
(1.8) 
7.29 
(1.8) 
29.42 
(7.3) 
5.67 
(1.4) 
1985 
20,085 
267.23 
(100.0) 
$107.25 
(40.1) 
90.43 
(33.8) 
5.02 
(1.9) 
9.66 
(3.6) 
3.13 
(1.2) 
21.04 
(7.9) 
19.61 
(7.3) 
4.50 
(1.7) 
1.78 
(0.7) 
4.81 
(1.8) 
NA 
Medicare Plus II1 
1986 
47,825 
286.11 
(100.0) 
$122.51 
(42.8) 
87.85 
(30.7) 
5.71 
(2.0) 
10.37 
(3.6) 
3.45 
(1.2) 
21.04 
(7.4) 
20.46 
(7.2) 
4.50 
(1.6) 
1.78 
(0.6) 
8.44 
(2.9) 
NA 
1987 
57,267 
307.75 
(100.0) 
$114.47 
(37.2) 
111.39 
(36.2) 
6.11 
(2.0) 
8.72 
(2.8) 
2.21 
(0.7) 
25.41 
(8.3) 
23.32 
(7.6) 
6.52 
(2.1) 
0.23 
(0.1) 
9.37 
(3.0) 
0 
1988 
62,252 
338.85 
(100.0) 
$142.10 
(41.9) 
100.42 
(29.6) 
6.08 
(1.8) 
17.98 
(5.3) 
2.94 
(0.9) 
30.30 
(8.9) 
24.05 
(7.1) 
7.33 
(2.2) 
0.18 
(0.1) 
7.47 
(2.2) 
0 
1989 
65,015 
357.08 
(100.0) 
$142.25 
(39.9) 
126.38 
(35.4) 
11.41 
(3.2) 
8.31 
(2.3) 
3.36 
(0.9) 
28.73 
(8.0) 
23.95 
(6.7) 
7.47 
(2.1) 
0.36 
(0.1) 
4.86 
(1.4) 
NA 
See footnotes at end of table. 
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Table 4—Continued 
Expenditures per member per month for services at social health maintenance organization sites, 
by type of expenditure and site: United States, 1985-89 
Type of expenditure 
Total member months 
Total cost 
Provider expenditures 
Hospital2 
Ambulatory 
encounters3 
Medicare nursing 
home4 
Medicare home 
health" 
Other Medicare5 
Chronic care6 
Expanded care7 
Case-management 
staff8 
Administrative expenditures 
Marketing 
Administration9 
Capital and other costs10 
1985 
6,704 
550.95 
(100.0) 
$102.56 
(18.6) 
372.00 
(13.1) 
12.16 
(2.2) 
2.15 
(0.4) 
3.68 
(0.7) 
32.87 
(6.0) 
30.89 
(5.6) 
22.20 
(4.0) 
112.55 
(20.4) 
91.28 
(16.6) 
68.61 
(12.4) 
SCAN Health Plan 
1986 
19,827 
413.44 
(100.0) 
$104.68 
(25.4) 
79.10 
(19.1) 
22.79 
(5.6) 
3.35 
(0.8) 
3.24 
(0.8) 
30.09 
(7.3) 
34.19 
(8.3) 
15.37 
(3.7) 
38.69 
(9.4) 
39.57 
(9.6) 
42.37 
(10.4) 
1987 
30,213 
402.58 
(100.0) 
$104.15 
(25.9) 
389.60 
(22.3) 
22.97 
(5.7) 
2.41 
(0.6) 
2.84 
(0.7) 
27.02 
(6.7) 
45.75 
(11.4) 
16.11 
(4.0) 
30.77 
(7.6) 
38.76 
(9.6) 
22.20 
(5.5) 
1988 
35,264 
389.83 
(100.0) 
109.03 
(28.0) 
104.65 
(26.9) 
23.22 
(6.0) 
3.00 
(0.8) 
0.91 
(0.2) 
24.36 
(6.2) 
31.48 
(8.1) 
11.83 
(3.0) 
20.77 
(5.3) 
42.92 
(11.0) 
17.66 
(4.5) 
1989 
34,985 
404.24 
(100.0) 
118.65 
(29.4) 
105.93 
(26.2) 
18.78 
(4.6) 
2.89 
(0.7) 
0.28 
(0.1) 
19.21 
(4.8) 
38.94 
(9.6) 
11.39 
(2.8) 
24.08 
(6.0) 
36.09 
(8.9) 
28.00 
(6.9) 
1985 
2,861 
434.33 
(100.0) 
$68.91 
(15.9) 
391.97 
(21.2) 
5.45 
(1.3) 
4.23 
(1.0) 
5.44 
(1.3) 
40.03 
(9.2) 
24.55 
(5.6) 
39.25 
(9.0) 
61.93 
(14.3) 
70.67 
(16.3) 
21.90 
(5.0) 
Seniors Plus1 
1986 
15,599 
294.08 
(100.0) 
$79.45 
(27.0) 
375.70 
(25.7) 
2.99 
(1.0) 
3.97 
(1.5) 
5.78 
(2.0) 
29.33 
(10.0) 
17.02 
(5.6) 
8.56 
(2.9) 
40.50 
(13.8) 
23.75 
(8.1) 
7.03 
(2.4) 
1987 
25,761 
271.40 
(100.0) 
88.30 
(32.5) 
387.45 
(32.2) 
2.37 
(0.9) 
4.45 
(1.6) 
5.49 
(2.0) 
23.50 
(8.7) 
17.17 
(6.3) 
8.32 
(3.1) 
16.93 
(6.2) 
13.20 
(4.9) 
4.22 
(1.6) 
1988 
33,878 
258.21 
(100.0) 
93.04 
(35.9) 
81.67 
(31.5) 
3.33 
(1.3) 
4.84 
(1.9) 
5.51 
(2.1) 
23.96 
(9.2) 
23.69 
(9.3) 
6.86 
(2.7) 
4.35 
(1.7) 
9.27 
(3.6) 
1.69 
(0.8) 
1989 
38,020 
331.40 
(100.0) 
108.39 
(32.7) 
120.54 
(36.5) 
10.10 
(3.0) 
5.71 
(1.7) 
6.03 
(1.8) 
27.92 
(8.4) 
25.90 
(7.8) 
6.94 
(2.1) 
2.24 
(0.7) 
16.92 
(5.1) 
0.71 
(0.2) 
1
 Kaiser Permanente Northwest reported adjusted community rate costs for services other than chronic care. 
2
 Hospital expenditures include in-area emergency and out-of-area services. For Seniors Plus and Kaiser Permanente Northwest, outside referrals were included 
in this figure. Figures for 1988 for Seniors Plus include pending claims for hospital services. 
3
 Includes medical referrals nd ambulatory encounters. SCAN Health Plan physicians received an additional $8 per member per month in 1985 from the risk 
reserves not shown in the above figures. 
4Includes Medicare only. 
5
 Durable medical equipment. 
6
 Includes non-Medicare skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility services, non-Medicare home health services, in-home services, and day care 
services. For Medicare Plus II, the average audited costs are shown for both 1985 and 1986. Included in the $21.04 are the estimated direct service claims of 
1985 ($7.24) and 1986 ($16.14), plus additional chronic care costs. 
7Includes dental, prescription drugs, vision, hearing aids, medical transportation, and emergency medical response system. 
8Average audited costs are shown for Medicare Plus II. These costs reached $6.75 per member per month by the end of 1986 for Medicare Plus II. 
9
 Includes all administrative costs including salaries and benefits. For Kaiser Permanente Northwest, beginning in 1986, health plan administration was identified 
as a separate component of the adjusted community rate and was included in the administration per member per month costs. Capital costs are not 
segregated. The Medicare Plus II administrative costs reported were only those for chronic care and not for the total plan in 1985. 
10
 Includes interest, depreciation, amortized startup and rent for administrative and staff offices, and risk reserves. 
11Figures for Seniors Plus are based on the claims paid through the end of the year. Actual expenditures may be higher than these figures reflect because not 
all claims for a given quarter are filed or paid during that quarter. Figures for 1988 are based on claims paid through March 1989. 
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are percents of total costs. NA denotes data not available. These data are unaudited and subject to later adjustments. 
Seniors Plus was reported on a cash basis; Elderplan and SCAN Health Plan were reported on an accrual basis; whereas Kaiser hospital, ambulatory care, and 
other Medicare costs were estimates rather than actual expenditures. 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
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Ambulatory care utilization varied across sites, with the 
two HMO-sponsored S/HMOs generally having lower 
utilization in the first 3 years (Table 5). In the fourth year 
during the full-risk sharing phase, Elderplan and SHP 
were able to reduce the number of ambulatory care 
encounters and referrals, so that the utilization patterns 
across the sites were very similar. Seniors Plus and 
Elderplan both showed sharp increases in their 
ambulatory care utilization rates in 1989, but Medicare 
Plus II held a steady pattern. 
Ambulatory care expenditure patterns were similar for 
all plans except Seniors Plus, which had lower 
expenditure patterns (until 1989). These expenditures 
ranged between $103 and $126 pmpm for 1989, ranging 
from 26 to 36 percent of total expenditures for S/HMOs 
(Table 4). Three sites reported keeping their ambulatory 
expenditures within their budget allocation. (Medicare 
Plus II waived premiums for deductibles and copayments 
from 1985 through 1989 and thus had a loss.) Seniors 
Plus experienced a sharp increase in expenditures in 1989 
that appeared to be directly related to the large increase in 
ambulatory care utilization rates for the year. Medicare 
Plus II also had a large increase in costs for 1989. In 
contrast, Elderplan was able to develop a capitated 
payment arrangement with many of its physician 
specialists and was thus able to lower its costs in 1989. 
Medicare long-term care services 
Medicare skilled nursing utilization rates varied across 
sites (Table 5). These rates were lowest at Seniors Plus 
by one-half, even though it had a substantially higher 
proportion of its members eligible for chronic care 
services (Table 1). Elderplan also had low-skilled nursing 
utilization but fewer members eligible for services. 
Interestingly, by 1989, all the plans had similar utilization 
patterns for skilled nursing homes and sharp increases in 
the number of skilled nursing home days per 1,000 
members. The increase in use was primarily attributed by 
sites to the change in the Medicare eligibility-for-payment 
rules instituted through the fiscal intermediaries in 1988 
and 1989. 
Medicare home health care utilization tended to show a 
reverse pattern to that of nursing home use. Home health 
visits per 1,000 members were highest at Elderplan, 
Medicare Plus II, and Seniors Plus, suggesting that these 
sites may have been substituting skilled home care for 
skilled nursing home care services. In contrast, SHP had 
high-skilled nursing use and low home health care 
utilization. 
Consistent with its low Medicare nursing home 
utilization, Seniors Plus had the lowest Medicare nursing 
home costs ($3 pmpm in 1988). Seniors Plus nursing 
Table 5 
Utilization of Medicare covered services across social health maintenance organization sites per 1,000 
members per year, by site and services covered: United States, 1985-89 
Type of health plan and covered service 
Elderplan 
Total member months 
Ambulatory encounters and referrals1 
Medicare skilled nursing facility days2 
Medicare home health visits3 
Medicare durable medical equipment 
Medicare Plus II 
Total member months 
Ambulatory encounters and referrals1 
Medicare skilled nursing facility days2 
Medicare home health visits3 
Medicare durable medical equipment 
SCAN Health Plan 
Total member months 
Ambulatory encounters and referrals1 
Medicare skilled nursing facility days2 
Medicare home health visits3 
Medicare durable medical equipment 
Seniors Plus 
Total member months 
Ambulatory encounters and referrals1 
Medicare skilled nursing facility days2 
Medicare home health visits3 
Medicare durable medical equipment 
1985 
5,310 
17,333 
199 
479 
— 
20,085 
10,289 
448 
1,375 
— 
6,708 
16,151 
546 
327 
— 
2,861 
8,963 
432 
1,233 
— 
1986 
19,640 
15,262 
445 
1,077 
— 
47,825 
10,086 
557 
1,815 
— 
19,826 
11,674 
1,246 
390 
— 
15,610 
8,809 
324 
740 
— 
1987 
38,570 
13,155 
1,132 
4,311 
— 
57,419 
9,696 
750 
1,579 
— 
30,213 
21,986 
1,195 
172 
1,914 
25,761 
9,633 
265 
840 
— 
1988 
56,335 
7,047 
395 
3,252 
— 
62,039 
9,677 
859 
1,379 
— 
35,176 
8,071 
969 
238 
— 
33,878 
8,762 
452 
1,803 
579 
1989 
61,488 
12,770 
1,120 
6,900 
— 
64,752 
9,655 
1,398 
1,408 
— 
34,985 
— 
1,153 
0 
67 
38,020 
12,272 
1,389 
1,772 
739 
1
 Ambulatory encounters are face-to-face contacts between a social health maintenance organization (S/HMO) member and a provider of health care services. 
They include medical, optometric, podiatric, mental health, and audiologic encounters and encounters with nurse practitioners and physician assistants that are 
not incident to seeing a physician. Medical referrals include services provided by medical specialists outside of the S/HMO and authorized by the S/HMO. 
Includes emergency room visits and all mental health visits. Nonphysician visits are also included. SCAN Health Plan data for 1989 are incomplete because of 
reporting problems. 
2
 Total census days in skilled nursing facilities. 
3
 Includes all home health visits (e.g., visits by a registered nurse, physical therapist, occupational therapist, speech therapist, social worker, and home health 
aides and hospice visits). SCAN Health Plan data for 1989 are unavailable. 
NOTES: These are unaudited data. Elderplan data are based on authorizations. All other sites are based on actual utilization. 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
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home cost did triple in 1989 as their nursing home 
utilization also tripled. Elderplan, with low nursing home 
utilization, had high Medicare nursing home 
expenditures, in part reflecting the higher nursing home 
reimbursement rates paid in New York State. SHP had 
the highest nursing home costs, consistent with its high 
nursing home use rates and its high daily reimbursement 
rates, but was able to lower its rate in 1989 with a 
change in its nursing home contract. 
SHP had the lowest Medicare home health care costs, 
again consistent with its low home health care utilization 
rates ($2.89 pmpm in 1989). Both Elderplan and 
Medicare Plus II were able to lower their Medicare home 
health care costs substantially in 1989 over those of the 
previous year, but both continued to have higher 
Medicare home health care costs than SHP and Seniors 
Plus. 
Chronic care services 
There were substantial variations across sites in chronic 
care utilization rates and patterns. These variations were 
attributable in part to differences in S/HMO site benefits, 
eligibility criteria for services, and the proportion of 
members receiving services, as discussed earlier 
(Table 1). 
The same pattern as the Medicare nursing home service 
utilization was revealed in a comparison of non-Medicare-
covered chronic care nursing service utilization across the 
four sites. Table 6 shows that in 1989, Seniors Plus had 
the lowest chronic care nursing home service use rates 
and somewhat higher home and homemaker utilization 
rates. SHP had the reverse pattern, with high nursing 
home use and lower home health and homemaker use. 
SHP's and Seniors Plus chronic care nursing home 
utilization was expected to be higher, because both plans 
had higher proportions of eligible members. In spite of 
higher proportions of members eligible for services, 
Seniors Plus was generally able to control its chronic care 
utilization. 
Elderplan was in a dilemma because it had the highest 
chronic care utilization in both nursing home and 
homemaker services but the lowest number of members 
certified as needing care and receiving services (Table 1). 
Thus, Elderplan provided more services to those few 
eligible individuals than other S/HMOs did. Medicare 
Plus II also had a consistently high use of chronic care 
nursing home and homemaker services in comparison 
with other sites. 
Total chronic care expenditures per member per month 
also varied across the sites—$19-$44 pmpm in 1989 
(Table 4). In 1989, Elderplan experienced a substantial 
increase in its pmpm costs (from $30 in 1988 to $44 in 
1989). Even though Elderplan had the lowest proportion 
of its members eligible for chronic care services, it had 
the highest utilization and cost rates per member. 
Medicare Plus II and SHP were both able to lower 
chronic care costs in 1989, even though their service 
utilization increased. Considering the high percent of 
individuals receiving chronic care services at Medicare 
Plus II and Seniors Plus, both were able to control 
expenditures remarkably well. Chronic care services 
represented only 5 to 11 percent of the total S/HMO 
expenditures at the sites in 1989. 
Table 6 
Utilization of chronic care services across social health maintenance organization sites per 1,000 
members per year, by site and chronic care service: United States, 1985-89 
Site and chronic care service 
Elderplan 
Chronic care SNF/ICF days 
Chronic care home health visits1 
Chronic care respite, homemaker, home aide, and chore hours2 
Day care center days3 
Medicare Plus II4 
Chronic care SNF/ICF days 
Chronic care home health visits1 
Chronic care respite, homemaker, home aide, and chore hours 
Day care center days 
SCAN Health Plan 
Chronic care SNF/ICF days 
Chronic care home health visits1 
Chronic care respite, homemaker, home aide, and chore hours 
Day care center days 
Seniors Plus 
Chronic care SNF/ICF days 
Chronic care home health visits1 
Chronic care respite, homemaker, home aide, and chore hours 
Day care center days 
1985 
199 
273 
40,165 
151 
613 
— 
4,180 
138 
1,487 
199 
10,787 
145 
2,562 
608 
17,364 
2,516 
1986 
835 
78 
21,154 
224 
1,426 
100 
7,849 
191 
1,852 
70 
15,589 
633 
1,815 
588 
12,157 
1,162 
1987 
1,012 
299 
18,926 
146 
2,342 
99 
11,927 
280 
5,551 
6 
7,020 
129 
1,983 
4,807 
4,369 
936 
1988 
425 
178 
15,923 
20 
2,339 
83 
14,400 
469 
5,100 
1 
3,996 
447 
1,140 
1,470 
9,226 
757 
1989 
1,636 
0 
40,277 
15 
1,050 
38 
16,090 
880 
831 
0 
4,520 
279 
458 
377 
8,907 
1,009 
1
 Includes all home health visits by a registered nurse, physical therapist, occupational therapist, speech therapist, and social worker and hospice visits. 
2
 Elderplan reported a total of 385 private duty nursing hours during 1985, and 2,320 hours during 1986. Elderplan did not report any totals for chronic care 
nursing home health visits during July and August 1986. 
3
 Includes social day care and day treatment center days. 
4
 Chronic care benefits were not offered to Medicaid members under the terms of the State Medicaid contract so that utilization is only calculated for Medicare 
member months at Medicare Plus II. Medicare Plus II reported a total of 1,741 home health aide visits and 363 homemaker visits in 1986. 
NOTES: SNF/ICF is skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility. These are unaudited data. Elderplan and Medicare Plus II data are based on 
authorizations. Data for all other sites are based on actual utilization. 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
Health Care Financing Review/Spring 1991/volume 12, Number 3 45 
Expanded care services 
Benefits and utilization of expanded care services such 
as pharmacy, dental, transportation, and other services 
varied across sites. Prescription use rates ranged from 
18 to 19 prescriptions per member per year at Medicare 
Plus II and SHP in 1989 (Table 7). It is not known how 
these prescription use rates compare with those of other 
Medicare HMOs that offer drug benefits, but anecdotal 
reports by HMOs suggest that other HMOs also have 
high rates. The S/HMOs all reported efforts to control 
costs by reviewing drug utilization and increasing drug 
copayments. Capitation contracts were used at SHP and 
Elderplan with pharmacy providers to control costs, and 
this resulted in a substantial reduction in use at Elderplan 
in 1989. Elderplan also introduced a drug formulary in 
1989 that further reduced its pharmacy costs. Medicare 
and SHP were both able to lower utilization rates in 
1989. 
Two sites (Elderplan and SHP) offered dental benefits, 
and Seniors Plus offered preventive dental benefits until 
1989. Utilization rates for eyeglasses, hearing aids, and 
durable medical equipment were 96 to 329 units per 
1,000 members per year. Other data on utilization of 
expanded care were incomplete. 
The expenditure rates for expanded care ranged from 
$24 to $52 pmpm in 1989 (Table 4). A large proportion 
of these expenses were for prescription drug benefits. 
Two HMO-sponsored S/HMOs (Seniors Plus and 
Medicare Plus II) had substantially lower expanded care 
expenditures than the other S/HMOs did. The reasons for 
the higher levels at SHP and Elderplan appear to be 
associated both with the difficulties in managing 
utilization and in their higher level of benefits. Lower 
expenditure levels at Medicare Plus II and Seniors Plus 
were, in part, because they offered slightly fewer 
expanded care benefits (e.g., dental coverage). 
Case management 
Case-management costs represented a small portion of 
overall expenditures, ranging from 2 to 3 percent of the 
S/HMO budgets in 1989—about $7-$ 11 pmpm (Table 4). 
These variations can be explained, in part, by the 
differences in eligibility for service and benefit levels 
discussed above and by differences in administrative, 
clerical, and other support staff time allocated to 
case-management costs (Yordi, 1988, 1990). The two 
S/HMOs sponsored by HMOs (Medicare Plus II and 
Seniors Plus), for example, did not include the full costs 
associated with utilization review and discharge planning 
performed by HMO personnel for S/HMO members in 
reporting expenditures. In contrast, Elderplan and SHP 
included case management as well as discharge planning 
and utilization review costs in their data. Seniors Plus had 
the highest proportion of its members using chronic care 
and case-management services (Table 1) and yet were 
Table 7 
Utilization of expanded care services across S/HMO sites per 1,000 members per year, by site and 
expanded care service: United States, 1985-89 
Site and expanded care service 
Elderplan 
Dental office visits 
Outpatient prescriptions 
Optometry and audiology visits 
Eyeglasses and hearing aids, and durable medical equipment (pieces) 
Emergency response system (months) 
Medical transportation (round trips)1 
Medicare Plus II 
Dental office visits 
Outpatient prescriptions 
Optometry and audiology visits 
Eyeglasses, hearing aids, and durable medical equipment (pieces) 
Emergency response system (months) 
Medical transportation (round trips)1 
SCAN Health Plan 
Dental office visits 
Outpatient prescriptions2 
Optometry and audiology visits 
Eyeglasses, hearing aids, and durable medical equipment (pieces) 
Emergency response system (months) 
Medical transportation (round trips)1 
Seniors Plus 
Dental office visits 
Outpatient prescriptions 
Optometry and audiology visits 
Eyeglasses, hearing aids, and durable medical equipment (pieces) 
Emergency response system (months) 
Medical transportation (round trips)1 
1985 
443 
15,060 
1,191 
585 
41 
2,235 
NA 
13,912 
NA 
609 
0 
39 
— 
19,305 
— 
804 
20 
109 
1,778 
— 
2,017 
— 
71 
839 
1986 
257 
18,172 
645 
297 
24 
2,162 
NA 
15,660 
NA 
408 
15 
75 
— 
20,693 
— 
686 
33 
571 
1,140 
— 
1,713 
— 
74 
803 
1987 
391 
15,594 
613 
285 
9 
1,223 
NA 
18,141 
NA 
346 
28 
98 
— 
21,673 
77 
1,549 
108 
518 
— 
— 
— 
219 
86 
715 
1988 
235 
6,674 
167 
282 
7 
523 
NA 
22,506 
NA 
308 
64 
176 
— 
20,288 
— 
322 
110 
246 
29 
— 
1,580 
303 
103 
962 
1989 
361 
NA 
348 
96 
7 
996 
NA 
18,756 
NA 
329 
76 
156 
NA 
17,556 
335 
221 
65 
223 
121 
— 
1,397 
295 
130 
1,063 
1Includes ambulance, ambulette (that is, invalid coach), and private-care service (with or without assistance). 
2Decrease in utilization was due to a reduction in the benefit levels; therefore, the utilization reported is only what SCAN Health Plan covered. 
NOTES: NA denotes data not available. These are unaudited data. Elderplan and Medicare Plus II data are based on authorizations. Data for all other sites are 
based on actual utilization. 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. 
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able to keep their case-management costs at a low level, 
by having a high patient-to-case manager ratio. Elderplan 
also had low case-management costs, but had fewer 
members using case-management services than any other 
site (Table 1). 
Marketing expenditures 
Table 4 shows marketing expenditures for each of the 
sites. Medicare Plus II had significantly lower marketing 
expenses than the other sites did (less than 1 percent of 
its total expenditures in 1985 and 1986), because it was 
able to meet its enrollment targets with a minimal 
marketing effort in 1986. Marketing expenditures at the 
three other sites varied substantially, but, initially, they 
represented about 14 to 20 percent of the total budgets in 
1985. The initial marketing budgets were low at three 
sites, but these budgets were significantly expanded as 
enrollment targets fell short of target levels. Initial 
S/HMO marketing expenditures were not substantially 
higher than the average expenditures reported by the 
Medicare HMO demonstrations for 1984 (Langwell et al., 
1986), but these marketing costs were substantially higher 
than expected by the sites. 
The S/HMOs gradually reduced their marketing 
expenditures each year during the 5-year period (except 
for SHP in 1989). The initial marketing costs for all plans 
(except Medicare Plus II) were high at a point in time 
when the S/HMOs were attempting to expand 
membership and when the marketing costs were paid 
primarily by HCFA and the State Medicaid programs 
under the demonstration risk-sharing arrangements. After 
mid-1987, when the S/HMOs assumed full financial risk 
for all costs, they reduced their marketing costs, even 
though all S/HMOs (except Seniors Plus) wanted to 
continue to increase enrollments. SHP continued to have 
high marketing expenses ($24 pmpm) in 1989, at a point 
in time when its membership was declining. 
Administrative expenditures 
Administrative expenditures, excluding marketing 
costs, varied significantly across sites (Table 4). Initially, 
administrative costs ranged from 16 to 29 percent of total 
S/HMO expenditures (except for Medicare Plus II, which 
was 1 to 2 percent throughout the 5-year period, because 
only administrative costs for the S/HMO component of 
the program were reported). (KP Northwest included its 
other administrative and capital costs within each service 
category). By 1989, the administrative cost had reduced 
sharply at the other three sites, except Medicare Plus II. 
In 1989, Seniors Plus was 5 percent, compared with 7 to 
9 percent for Elderplan and SHP. These differences 
followed the new versus the established HMO origins of 
the demonstration projects. The established HMOs' 
sponsors were able to utilize administrative resources 
from their existing organization for S/HMO projects, 
whereas Elderplan and SHP had to establish new 
administrative structures for all S/HMO operations. 
Seniors Plus had its administrative costs subsidized by its 
sponsors until 1989, when the plan assumed the full 
costs. 
Overall financial outcomes 
The utilization and expenditure patterns as previously 
described had an overall impact on each of the S/HMOs 
during the 5-year period. Table 8 shows that the revenues 
for the first 5 years of the project were about 
$226 million for the four projects. Revenues were 
primarily from Medicare payments (77-86 percent), but 
they also included subscriber premiums, Medicaid, 
copayments, and other sources. The average revenues 
varied across sites and were based in part on the age, 
sex, disability status, and location of the members. 
Medicare Plus II received an average of about 
$326 pmpm for 1989, compared with about $430 at SHP. 
Seniors Plus had the lowest revenues pmpm (about $320 
in 1989) and the lowest overall revenues because it had 
low membership and low Medicare rates. 
Total average expenditures, including financial 
reserves, varied substantially across sites, ranging from 
about $267-$684 pmpm in 1985 to about $331-$404 
pmpm in 1989 (Table 8). During the period 1985-88, the 
average expenditures declined (except at Medicare 
Plus II), in part because the projects lowered their 
marketing and administrative costs. Medicare Plus II had 
low marketing and administrative costs throughout the 
entire period; thus, its service costs increased annually as 
would be expected. In 1989, Seniors Plus and SHP had 
increases in their per member expenditures. 
The net gains and losses for each project are shown in 
Table 8. The discussion is divided into the risk-sharing 
period (first 30 months, 1985 to mid-1987) and the last 
30 months (mid-1987 through 1989), when S/HMOs 
assumed full financial risk. During the startup phase, 
HCFA shared the financial losses (along with the State 
Medicaid program at Elderplan, Seniors Plus, and SHP) 
with the S/HMOs. KP Northwest assumed full financial 
risk for all Medicare-covered services initially and for all 
chronic care services after 18 months. Because each of 
the S/HMOs except Medicare Plus II had limited financial 
risks during the initial period ($425,000 to $700,000), 
S/HMOs had little incentive for cost containment (Clark, 
1986). During the first 3 years, Seniors Plus experienced 
the fewest losses (less than $2 million). Elderplan 
experienced the greatest losses ($8 million), and SHP had 
losses of about $3 million. Medicare Plus II experienced 
a net gain of $0.65 million during 1985 and 1986 on its 
chronic care services but a loss of $1.4 million on its 
Medicare-covered services, thereby realizing a net loss 
for the period. Its losses in 1987 were also on the 
Medicare-covered services. 
After S/HMOs assumed full financial risks, they were 
able to reduce their costs and to improve their overall 
financial picture. Elderplan had the highest initial losses 
($376 pmpm in 1985) but was able to lower its pmpm 
costs each year. It had hoped to break even in 1988, but 
unexpectedly high hospital costs for the year resulted in a 
$2.5 million loss for the year and liabilities of 
$3.6 million. After full risk sharing, Elderplan reported a 
number of changes to control costs, including hiring a 
new administrator with a strong financial background, 
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Table 8 
Social health maintenance organization revenues, expenditures per member per month (pmpm), 
and net gain or loss: 1985-89 
Item 
Elderplan 
Total member months 
Total revenue pmpm 
Total revenue 
Total expenditures pmpm 
Total expenditures plus reserves 
Total gain or loss pmpm 
Net gain or loss 
Medicare Plus II1 
Total member months 
Total revenue pmpm 
Total revenue 
Total expenditures pmpm 
Total expenditures plus reserves 
Total gain or loss pmpm 
Net gain or loss 
SCAN Health Plan 
Total member months 
Total revenue pmpm 
Total revenue 
Total expenditures pmpm 
Total expeditures plus reserves 
Total gain or loss pmpm 
Net gain or loss 
Seniors Plus2 
Total member months 
Total revenue pmpm 
Total revenue 
Total expenditures pmpm 
Total expenditures plus reserves 
Total gain or loss pmpm 
Net gain or loss 
1985 
5,310 
$307.54 
$1,633,024 
$683.96 
$3,631,846 
$376.43 
$1,998,822 
20,085 
$255.11 
$5,123,953 
$267.23 
$5,367,315 
$12.12 
$243,430 
6,704 
$334.45 
$2,242,159 
$550.95 
$3,693,592 
$216.50 
$1,451,433 
2,861 
$237.53 
$679,571 
$434.33 
$1,242,616 
$196.80 
$563,045 
1986 
19,640 
$291.58 
$5,726,551 
$464.38 
$9,120,503 
$172.81 
$3,393,952 
47,825 
$273.34 
$13,072,459 
$286.11 
$13,683,211 
$12.77 
$610,752 
19,827 
$351.68 
$6,972,727 
$413.44 
$8,197,206 
$61.76 
$1,224,479 
15,599 
$227.61 
$3,550,462 
$294.08 
$4,587,308 
$66.47 
$1,036,846 
1987 
38,570 
$329.21 
$12,697,483 
$406.66 
$15,684,883 
$77.45 
$2,987,400 
57,267 
$300.89 
$17,230,964 
$307.75 
$17,623,919 
$6.86 
$392,955 
30,228 
$354.93 
$10,728,727 
$402.58 
$12,169,157 
$47.65 
$1,440,430 
25,761 
$251.12 
$6,469,116 
$271.40 
$6,991,634 
$20.28 
$522,518 
1988 
56,335 
$373.22 
$21,025,172 
$417.33 
$23,510,515 
$44.12 
$2,485,343 
62,252 
$326.90 
$20,350,340 
$338.85 
$21,094,090 
$11.95 
$743,750 
35,264 
$398.11 
$14,038,834 
$389.83 
$13,747,058 
$8.27 
$291,776 
33,878 
$278.30 
$9,428,328 
$258.21 
$8,747,621 
$20.09 
$680,707 
1989 
61,488 
$403.54 
$24,812,925 
$403.48 
$24,808,931 
$0.06 
$3,994 
65,015 
$325.97 
$21,193,158 
$357.08 
$23,215,556 
$31.11 
$2,022,398 
34,985 
$429.98 
$15,042,820 
$404.24 
$14,142,489 
$25.73 
$900,331 
38,020 
$319.76 
$12,157,262 
$331.40 
$12,599,859 
$11.64 
$442,597 
1The total amount of savings from the chronic care component of Medicare Plus II was $654,840 for 1985 and 1986. Expenditures for Medicare-covered 
benefits, including acute and ambulatory care, were based on the adjusted community rate and resulted in a loss of $1.4 million, so that the overall loss was 
$854,182 for 1985 and 1986. The chronic care savings in 1987 was $229,462, which when combined with the interest from the Benefit Stabilization Fund (BSF) 
resulted in a total BSF of $919,342 at yearend 1987. In 1987, the total loss was on Medicare-covered services. Of the total loss in 1988, $221,444 was on 
chronic care services and $522,306 was on the Medicare-covered services and supplemental benefits. Some funds from the BSF were used in 1988 to cover 
the losses on the chronic care services, and with accrued interest, the balance in the BSF was $729,298 at the end of 1988. There was no BSF activity in 1989; 
therefore, the additional interest accrued in 1989 brought the 1989 BSF yearend balance to $783,429. In 1989, the loss was all on the Medicare-covered 
services. 
2Seniors Plus data are based on actual date-of-service expenditures rather than on date of payment. 
NOTE: These are unaudited data and subject to later adjustments. 
SOURCE: Harrington, C. and Newcomer, R.J., University of California, Department of Behavioral Sciences. 
reducing administrative overhead, adding a second 
physician group on a capitation contract and another 
major hospital contractor, raising premiums by about $7 
in 1989, reducing marketing expenditures, and 
establishing an at-risk pharmacy capitation contract with a 
new organization. In 1989, Elderplan was able to break 
even financially by, in part, shifting much of its 
hospitalization to two hospitals that offered per diem 
discount rates, capitating many of their physician 
specialists, and introducing a drug formulary to control 
pharmacy costs. 
SHP also experienced high startup costs and losses of 
about $3 million during the first 3 years. SHP was able to 
achieve a net gain in both 1988 and 1989 by making a 
number of changes in its operations: reducing benefits 
including hearing aids, providing chronic care benefits 
only to those members who were nursing home 
certifiable, increasing its copayments, and shifting greater 
financial risks to its hospital and physician group 
contractors. Although SHP was showing a positive 
balance in 1988, its sole hospital and physician group 
contractors reported losses in 1988. In 1989, SHP 
reduced its benefit package for custodial nursing home 
stays, limited its pharmacy benefit and increased its 
pharmacy copayment (to 25 percent), asked its primary 
hospital and physician contractors to increase their share 
of risk, and added a second hospital and physician group 
(effective in 1990). In 1990, SHP and its primary hospital 
and physician contractors were unable to reach an 
agreement on a contract; this resulted in SHP's obtaining 
a new hospital and physician group contractor and 
realizing a subsequent sharp loss in enrollment for the 
period 1989-90. 
Seniors Plus had high initial losses that were primarily 
related to its high marketing costs and low enrollment. In 
order to reduce its costs, in 1988, Seniors Plus increased 
its premium by $5 per month, increased its home care 
benefits, reduced its chronic care nursing home benefit, 
reduced its marketing costs, and eliminated its preventive 
dental benefit. By 1988, Seniors Plus was able to show a 
positive balance, but it was still receiving financial 
support for administrative costs from its sponsors, GHI 
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and Ebenezer. In 1989, Seniors Plus again reported 
losses, but this was because of two primary factors: a 
large unexpected increase in hospital utilization and in 
Medicare skilled nursing utilization (because of changes 
in Medicare eligibility for services) and the assumption of 
financial responsibility for its administrative services from 
both its sponsors. Seniors Plus had a reserve fund that 
offset about one-half of its losses in 1989, and the 
remainder was covered by its sponsors. 
Even though Medicare Plus II was the most successful 
of the S/HMO projects in reaching its membership goals, 
in having low marketing and administrative costs, and in 
maintaining low service utilization, Medicare Plus II was 
the only project that showed losses over the 5-year 
period. The $1.25 million in losses during the period 
1985-87 by Medicare Plus II were all on the Medicare-
covered benefits. During this period, Medicare Plus II 
established a benefit stabilization fund from the chronic 
care savings to use as its membership aged and became 
more costly. In 1988, Medicare Plus II lost $744,000, of 
which 30 percent was attributed to chronic care costs and 
the remainder to Medicare-covered services. In 1989, 
Medicare Plus II reported a loss of $2 million that was 
attributed to Medicare-covered services. The losses on 
Medicare-covered services were due to premium waivers 
planned by KP Northwest at the beginning of each year. 
Financial effects on sponsors 
The revenues and losses of each S/HMO had important 
impacts on its sponsor or partner. Although S/HMOs 
brought in new revenues that were important to each of 
the sponsors or partners, the losses and opportunity costs 
were greater than expected at a time when all of the 
sponsors and partners were experiencing some financial 
difficulties of their own. 
Medicare Plus II, as a new product line, increased 
revenues for KP Northwest (e.g., its $13 million in 
revenues represented 4.6 percent of the total 
KP Northwest revenues ($280 million) in 1986). 
KP Northwest was responsible for the annual losses of 
the S/HMO during the 5-year period, but this was not 
problematic in 1986 and 1987, when KP Northwest 
experienced $5.8 million and $12 million, respectively, in 
net income. These overall gains were reversed in 
1987-89, when KP Northwest had a loss of $8.7 million 
in 1988 and $2.5 million in 1989. Thus, KP Northwest 
had to assume S/HMO losses during a period when 
KP Northwest had other financial concerns. 
The revenues from Seniors Plus represented a smaller 
proportion of total revenues to GHI and Ebenezer than 
expected. Seniors Plus was 1 of 10 projects sponsored by 
GHI, representing less than 1 percent of GHI's total 
membership and about 2.5 percent of the total GHI 
revenues in 1986. Ebenezer received 2.6 percent 
($0.6 million) of its total revenues in 1986 from Seniors 
Plus. Although new revenues were desired, Seniors Plus's 
losses in the first 3 years were of concern to its sponsors 
because both were experiencing financial problems 
unrelated to the S/HMO project. Because of financial 
problems, Ebenezer affiliated with Lutheran General in 
1987 and received an infusion of funds from its new 
owner to cover $3 million in losses acquired in 1985 and 
1986. The Ebenezer financial picture improved, showing 
a net gain of about $1 million in 1988 and $1.5 million 
in 1989. 
GHI had less revenue than expected in 1985 and 1986 
and slow enrollment growth until 1987, when it received 
a 10-percent enrollment increase. GHI made $110,000 in 
revenues over expenditures in 1987, although all other 
HMOs in the metropolitan area showed losses for the 
period. GHI showed $1.2 million in excess revenues over 
expenditures in 1988 and $4.1 million in 1989. GHI and 
Ebenezer covered the losses of Seniors Plus, initially on a 
50/50 basis. In 1989, GHI assumed 80 percent of the 
losses and Ebenezer assumed 20 percent. About one-half 
of the 1989 losses at Seniors Plus were offset by the 
reserve fund. 
The initial losses by Seniors Plus were of surprise and 
concern to both GHI and Ebenezer managers because 
these losses were considered not only a lost opportunity 
but also a potential financial liability for the sponsors in 
the future when they assume full financial risk. Although 
the financial picture at GHI and Ebenezer improved in 
1987 and 1988, the sponsors placed a high priority on 
having Seniors Plus break even financially. Although 
GHI and Ebenezer agreed to continue the S/HMO 
demonstration at full financial risk beyond the first 
30 months, Seniors Plus reduced its level of effort in 
marketing, closed enrollment to non-GHI members late in 
1988 because of capacity problems, instituted utilization 
controls, and redefined its chronic benefits in 1988 and 
1989. 
The Metropolitan Jewish Geriatric Center (MJGC), 
Inc., contributed to Elderplan to cover the startup costs 
for the first 36 months with the expectation that Elderplan 
would increase new revenue to MJGC's nursing homes 
and home care programs. Elderplan's revenues were 
$6 million compared with a total of $55 million in 
revenues for MJGC in 1986. Although Elderplan 
revenues were important to MJGC, its losses of 
$3.4 million in 1985 and 1986 were a potential threat to 
the sponsoring organization, even though most of these 
losses were assumed by HCFA. In 1986, MJGC had a 
net loss of $2.8 million (exclusive of Elderplan losses), 
which had to be covered by private fund-raising efforts. 
In 1987, MJGC continued to have losses totaling $1.1 
million (exclusive of Elderplan). Elderplan, as noted 
earlier, lost money each year until 1989, when it nearly 
broke even. MJGC guaranteed Elderplan's accumulated 
financial liabilities, which were a total of $3.6 million at 
the end of 1988, but reduced to $2.6 million in 1989. 
The high Elderplan losses have necessitated a 
re-evaluation of the future of the demonstration by 
MJGC. MJGC has various options, including finding a 
partner or a buyer for Elderplan or discontinuing the 
project. Even though Elderplan has sought a joint venture 
partner, it was unable to find such an arrangement 
throughout the period 1985-89. 
SHP was the only plan that represented a major 
proportion of its sponsor (SCAN) organization's budget 
and activities. SCAN, with no capital of its own for 
startup, had to rely on a $1 million loan from St. Mary 
Medical Center to initiate SHP (hereafter referred to as 
St. Mary's). SHP reported $8 million in revenues in 1986 
and $11 million in 1987, while its parent, SCAN, had 
only $1.9 million in additional revenues in 1986 and 
$3 million in 1987. SHP losses of $2.6 million in 
1986-87 would have overwhelmed the financial capacity 
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of SCAN if HCFA had not assumed most of the financial 
risk during the initial period. 
Initial losses at SHP were much higher than expected 
by either SCAN or St. Mary Medical Center. Although 
SCAN was limited in its financial ability to contribute to 
SHP, St. Mary's was in a position to assist SHP through 
its loan guarantee. St. Mary's reported a 7-percent 
increase in revenues over the previous year and 
$46 million in fixed assets net accumulated depreciation 
in 1986. Even though SHP represented only a small 
proportion of St. Mary's revenues (3 percent in 1986), it 
did contribute to St. Mary's income. In 1987, St. Mary's 
agreed to defer the SHP debt payments of the principal 
and interest and was willing to assume full financial risk 
for SHP during the final period of the demonstration. 
Changes were made in SHP's operations as noted earlier, 
and SHP was able to break even and begin making 
repayments on its loan in 1988 to St. Mary. In late 1989 
(effective in 1990), SHP and St. Mary's terminated their 
contractual arrangements for the S/HMO demonstration 
project. By that time, SHP had paid the majority of the 
loan money back to St. Mary's and continued to make 
monthly payments on the outstanding balance. 
In retrospect, the sponsor-parent organizations, except 
for KP Northwest, reported that they did not understand 
the potential financial problems involved in sponsoring 
the S/HMO demonstration projects. During the initial 
period of the demonstration, all four of the organizations 
that undertook the demonstrations experienced some 
unexpected form of financial problems unrelated to the 
demonstrations. These financial problems contributed to 
the pressures for S/HMOs to achieve greater efficiency 
and tighten utilization controls during the period of full 
financial risk. 
Discussion 
Because of lower-than-expected Medicare and 
Medicaid enrollments during the first 3 years of 
operation, the S/HMOs (except KP Northwest) 
overestimated their total revenues. Low revenues and 
high administrative costs related to S/HMO startup were 
especially problematic for the new HMOs (Elderplan and 
SHP). The S/HMOs underestimated the marketing effort 
needed, and these costs became high for the three 
S/HMOs with low enrollments as they attempted to reach 
their enrollment goals. The S/HMOs faced strong 
competition in two sites, where Medicare HMOs were 
able to enroll large segments of the market. Higher 
premiums than those of the competing Medicare HMOs 
and limited benefits beyond those of competing Medicare 
HMOs contributed to low enrollments at SHP and Seniors 
Plus. 
The experience of the first 5 years raises a number of 
policy issues, including what should the risk-sharing 
arrangements have been. S/HMO risk-sharing 
arrangements gave the projects strong incentives to load 
marketing and administrative costs into the initial period 
when HCFA was paying for the majority of the cost 
overruns. Although it was necessary to have risk sharing 
by HCFA and for the Medicaid programs to encourage 
providers to participate in the S/HMO demonstration, 
future projects should probably be asked to assume a 
greater proportion of the initial risks. 
Another issue is what financial criteria should 
sponsoring organizations be required to meet to 
participate in demonstrations. During the beginning of the 
demonstration, all the sponsors had some financial 
difficulties unrelated to S/HMOs and, except for 
KP Northwest, underestimated the overall cost of 
undertaking the demonstration project. Sponsoring 
agencies of any new S/HMO that may be developed in 
the future should be financially sound, should understand 
the costs of initiating such a demonstration, and should 
ensure that the organization is willing to make a 
commitment to such a project. 
Another issue is what should be the basic requirements 
in terms of structure and/or experience for sponsoring 
organizations to participate in a S/HMO demonstration. 
The problems of high pmpm service costs for the two 
S/HMOs (Elderplan and SHP) that were newly formed 
HMOs were caused primarily by high acute and 
ambulatory utilization, which represented the majority of 
S/HMO expenditures. Elderplan and SHP had no 
experience in delivering prepaid care or experience on 
which to base their financial budgets and utilization 
objectives. These organizations had limited capital for 
startup, and the startup costs represented major financial 
efforts. The fact that two long-term care organizations 
were able to develop into HMOs, although limited to the 
elderly, and deliver services within a short startup period 
was rather remarkable and demonstrated the commitment 
of the organizations and the individual project directors 
and their staffs. Although the problems encountered in 
building new HMOs from long-term care organizations 
were expected to some extent, the difficulties experienced 
raise questions about the rationale of such an approach 
for the future. Certainly, it is more expensive and more 
effort to develop new HMOs for S/HMO projects. 
The two established HMOs (KP Northwest and GHI) 
that added S/HMO projects as new products to their 
existing service plans appeared to be better able to control 
utilization of acute and ambulatory care, although this 
low utilization did not translate to lower costs for 
KP Northwest. Seniors Plus was remarkable in its ability 
to control its service utilization and expenditures, even on 
chronic care costs, in spite of having the lowest total 
enrollment and substantially higher proportions of those 
who were eligible for and receiving chronic care services. 
In part, this was because the established HMOs were able 
to economize by using their existing service delivery 
networks and physicians experienced in controlling 
utilization. 
Another issue is how to control Medicare-covered 
service costs or at least how to develop cost estimates for 
such costs. It is not clear why KP Northwest reported 
such high costs for its Medicare-covered services, which 
it experienced on both its Medicare HMO contract and its 
S/HMO program. These losses were expected because 
KP Northwest waived its premiums on deductibles and 
copayments. Its higher service costs are also related to 
the way it includes administrative and capital costs within 
each service category. Another question is whether 
KP Northwest will be willing to continue the project 
beyond the demonstration period, considering it has not 
been able to control its Medicare-related costs. On the 
other hand, KP Northwest has also reported losses on its 
basic Medicare HMO contract and has continued that 
program since 1985. 
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Another issue is how best to control chronic care costs. 
Overall, all S/HMOs were able to control their chronic 
care utilization and expenditures by a combination of 
methods. These included limiting benefits in terms of 
total dollar amounts with 10 to 20 percent copayments, 
using case managers to limit eligibility to those who were 
impaired, using case managers to limit chronic care 
service use, reducing administrative costs, and developing 
contractual arrangements with providers for chronic care 
services. In this sense, S/HMOs were successful in 
staying within their budgets. Whether these types of 
limited chronic care benefits and strict utilization controls 
are attractive enough to healthy individuals so that 
adequate numbers can be enrolled without adverse 
selection is still an open question, at least at sites where 
there is heavy Medicare HMO competition. 
Looking to the future, the ultimate test remains 
whether the four established S/HMOs can become viable 
financial organizations or product lines within larger 
HMO organizations and survive after the S/HMO's 
demonstration period is over. Presumably S/HMOs will 
be able to make use of their initial experience to bring 
greater efficiency to the management of the program 
along with greater accuracy in financial planning. 
Enrollment growth will also be important at Elderplan 
and SHP for improving their financial picture. 
Although some initial losses were expected, the 
financial viability of S/HMOs is still undetermined. 
Several options that are not mutually exclusive are 
available to the four established S/HMOs to become more 
financially viable. One is to continue to reduce benefits, 
increase copayments, and control access to long-term care 
services. The risks in this approach are clear because 
S/HMO benefits are already viewed as limited. 
Reductions in benefits make S/HMOs less distinguishable 
from HMOs and may only increase marketing problems, 
particularly in the areas where market competition is 
greatest. 
A second option is to redefine the product as a 
high-option benefit plan, which may be coupled with a 
low-option plan within an HMO. This approach may 
make the produce more understandable and marketable. 
KP Northwest did test its ability to market both its basic 
Medicare HMO product and its S/HMO product during 
1987. Even though the premium was significantly higher 
for the S/HMO, KP Northwest found that the largest 
proportion of new members during the period elected the 
S/HMO and that there did not appear to be any adverse 
selection in terms of member disability characteristics. On 
the other hand, GHI, which marketed both its S/HMO 
and a Medicare HMO throughout the demonstration 
period, reported that those members who joined the 
S/HMO had higher rates of disability. Consequently, GHI 
was reluctant to market the S/HMO and kept its 
enrollment low. 
A third option is to increase the financial risk sharing 
of S/HMO providers, including the long-term care 
providers, so that these providers assume greater financial 
incentives to control costs (e.g., capitation contracts). 
This effort would shift the risk to providers but would not 
necessarily reduce or control provider reimbursement 
rates. SHP was the S/HMO that was most effective in 
establishing risk arrangements with its contract providers, 
which included hospitals, physicians, nursing homes, 
pharmacy services, and home health (all except 
homemakers). Their arrangements with their sole hospital 
and physician provider group during 1985-89 were not 
considered entirely satisfactory by their contractors, 
however, nor were the rates necessarily comparable to 
market rates. These risk-sharing arrangements lead to 
some difficulties in provider relations and, eventually, to 
the loss of the contractual arrangements. Medicare Plus II 
had its own acute and ambulatory care providers but had 
high unit costs for its services. Even though these were 
problems, new capitation agreements with reasonable 
rates are options to be further explored. 
A fourth option is to increase administrative efficiency. 
This would particularly apply at Elderplan and SHP, 
where administrative costs are high in comparison with 
the other two S/HMOs. If Elderplan and SHP were able 
to develop HMOs for the population under 65 years of 
age or to work jointly with an existing HMO, perhaps 
some administrative savings could be achieved by 
spreading these costs across a larger enrollment base with 
a younger membership. 
Another policy issue that needs to be addressed is how 
to meet Federal HMO requirements beyond the 
demonstration period. Federal laws presently require 
HMOs to limit Medicare and Medicaid members to no 
more than 50 percent of their total enrolled population. If 
Elderplan and SHP are to continue beyond the 
demonstration period, they will either require a waiver 
from these Federal provisions or they will have to meet 
these requirements. One option is to develop a 
partnership or a joint venture with an existing HMO, 
insurer, or health care organization to enroll an HMO 
population under 65 years of age. Another option would 
be to sell Elderplan and SHP to an existing HMO or to 
an organization that wanted to develop an HMO with a 
membership under 65 years of age. 
Whether Elderplan and SHP can find a partner or a 
buyer depends on a number of factors described by Goran 
(1981), including the promise of a reasonable rate of 
return on investment in the future, the liquidity of the 
plan, the ability of the plan to attract and maintain 
members, evidence of management capability to achieve 
its utilization targets, and a sound business plan. At this 
time, neither Elderplan nor SHP has been able to develop 
such a partnership with an existing HMO that has a 
membership under 65 years of age, and no plans have 
been developed for the continuation after the 1995 
demonstration period. Although it is unclear what 
ultimate directions the S/HMOs will take at the end of the 
demonstration period, these decisions will be clearly tied 
to financial and marketing considerations. 
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